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Twenty Years of Television in Israel: Are 
There Long-Run Effects on Values and 
Cultural Practices? 
 
Elihu Katz and Hadassah Haas 
 
      Television broadcasting was introduced in Israel late, after 
years of debate over its likely effects. Opponents of the medium, led 
by David Ben-Gurion, thought that renascent Hebrew culture would 
be undermined by the introduction of foreign values, that the People 
of the Book would turn into the people of television, that ascetic and 
pioneering values would be uprooted by consumerism, that 
ideological politics would be displaced by personality politics. Those 
in favor of the introduction of television argued that the medium 
carried no intrinsic message, that it would do whatever it was told 
inform, educate, teach Hebrew, absorb immigrants, foster creativity, 
enfranchise marginal groups, show Israel's achievements to itself and 
to the world. 
      The absence of television seemed more acute on the eve of the 
Six Day War of 1967 inasmuch as TV broadcasts were being received 
from the surrounding Arab states. Indeed, television was introduced in 
Israel shortly after this war-not only to right the ostensible propaganda 
disadvantage, but because it was thought, wishfully, that the new 
medium would make for effective communication between Israelis 
and people in the newly occupied territories. Some of those who 
opposed television thought that this was simply a bandy 
rationalization, but in the post-war euphoria, not many opponents 
were left. 
      In 1970-but without any specific reference to the fact that 
television broadcasting had just begun-the Ministry of Education and 
Culture commissioned a major study of the uses of leisure, culture 
and communication in Israel (Katz and Gurevitch, 1974). Twenty 
years later, in 1990, a repeat study was commissioned by the Ministry 
and the US-Israel Bi-National Science Foundation. Based on 
face-to-face interviews with national samples of 3000 Israelis (the 
1990 study includes the Arab sector as well), the two studies are 
comparable in almost every respect. By good fortune, therefore, we 
are in a position to assess the long-run effects of introducing 
television on a whole society. This is much easier said than done, 
however, because so many other things have happened during the 20 
years between the studies. It is only at great risk, therefore, that one 
can attribute causality to television in accounting for the changes in 
Israeli culture and society during this period. It is especially ironic, 
because not a few of the changes that emerge from comparing the two 
studies coincide with the predictions of its effect-more often with 
those of its opponents than with its proponents. 
      Thus, the trouble with trying to analyze the effects of 20 years 
of television is that this same 20-year period also includes two wars, a 
doubling of the population, and an increase in the level of general 
education such that the society, on average, is three years more 
educated than in 1970. Moreover, 1977 saw the first overturn of 
Israeli politics from left to right and the coming to political maturity 
of the second generation of immigrants from Asian and African 
countries. The new parity between citizens of Eastern and Western 
background challenged not only the long-standing political consensus, 
but also the (predominantly Western) cultural order. During the 
20-year period, an additional hour of leisure was added to the day, a 
second day off from work was given (Friday) and a rise in the 
standard of living achieved. To study the long-run effects of television, 
therefore, one has to know how to sort out the effects of television 
from those of war, affluence, education, political change, cultural 
pluralism and so on! 
      Having sounded the warning, let us proceed nevertheless to 
examine changing trends in the values and cultural practices of Jewish 
Israelis over these twenty years, and to speculate about the extent to 
which they may be attributable to television.
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 To accomplish this, the 
paper will proceed as follows: (1) it will present an overview of the 
ways in which television broadcasting was institutionalized in Israel; 
(2) it will consider the patterns of television viewing; (3) it will report 
on major changes in the patterns of consuming culture and the arts, 
including reading; (4) it will review the study's findings concerning 
value changes in Israeli society during this period; (5) it will report on 
the changes in the functions and gratifications provided by the media, 
old and new, with respect to these values. Having done so, we shall 
return to weigh the possible long-run effects of television. 
 
Television: The Israeli Version 
 
      From its inception, broadcasting in Israel was a monopoly 
service provided at first by the Government, and, from 1965, by a 
BBC-like authority financed by a license fee and directed by a Board 
of Governors representing the political spectrum but independent of 
Government. When television was established in 1968, joining radio 
as one of the services of the monopolistic Israel Broadcasting 
Authority (IB), Israel Television operated only one channel-which it 
yielded during the daytime hours to the Educational Broadcasting 
service of the Ministry of Education. Cable television by subscription 
was introduced in the early 90s, and a second over-the-air channel 
(like the British ITV) was introduced in 1993, financed by advertising 
but overseen by a public Board, different from that of the IBA. 
      Before the very recent introduction of multiple channels, Israel 
TV had excelled in coverage of news and public affairs, although this 
achievement was sometimes impeded by the overly politicized 
appointments of the Governing Board and of the Director General. As 
good as it was at public affairs, it was poor, at best, in original drama 
and light entertainment. Jokers used to say that Israel television could 
well do without drama and entertainment, since there is plenty of that 
in the news. 
     In its best days, the main 9 pm news attracted 70% of the 
population on an average evening. Critics and advocates of multiple 
channels objected that a society cannot claim to be democratic if it 
has only one television channel and one major news bulletin. Yet, the 
evidence shows that this highly politicized society collected itself for 
the nightly news magazine and willingly accepted its agenda for 
political discussion. There was no evidence of brainwashing: hawks 
and doves, Jews and Arabs viewed the monopolistic news magazine, 
believed it on the whole, and used it to talk politics not only in 
like-thinking groups but across political divisions.
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 Indeed, the 9 pm 
news magazine became a sort of civic ritual during which the society 
communed with itself. There was an informal norm that attendance 
was "required," and that there were to be no intrusions during the 
news-no telephone calls, for example. American politicians now are 
talking wishfully about how to organize "electronic town meetings" 
-having blithely exchanged their three channels for hundreds. Rather 
than undemocratic, the lesson of 15 years of Israel TV is that 
participatory democracy may be enhanced, rather than impeded, by 
gathering its citizens in a single public space set aside for receiving 
and discussing reliable reports on the issues of the day. 
      The introduction of multiple channels has changed the picture. 
The heavy emphasis on news and public affairs has given way to 
much lighter entertainment on the new channels. Even the many 
cheap-to produce political talk shows are sprinkled with very high 
doses of sensation, scandal, personalities, provocations, and pop. And 
advertising interrupts everything. Ironically, the introduction of a 
competing news magazine (at the same hour as the original) has 
lowered the total number of viewers of both programs-as if the very 
offer of choice abolished the norm of collective viewing of the 
television news.  
     Like in other countries-not only the smaller ones-a high 
percentage of television programming is imported from abroad, 
especially from the United States. The new second channel promised 
to commission many more programs from local producers, but with 
double the hours of broadcasting, the overall ratio of domestic to 
imported programming has declined, if anything, to well below 50%. 
If one also takes account of the dozen or more cable channels-now 
reaching some 60% of the population-the proportion of homemade 
programming is tiny. 
      The idea that fewer hours of broadcasting might result in 
better programs does not occur to anybody. Since its inception in 
1968, Israel TV has gone from three nights per week of experimental 
broadcasting, to six nights per week, and, after a religious/political/ 
cultural battle over Sabbath-eve broadcasting, to seven nights. The 
next frontier was breakfast television. And with the inauguration of 
cable channels and the second over-the-air channel, television in 
Israel has become the non-stop public utility so familiar in the rest of 
the world. 
The Viewers 
  
      Apart from a few religious and secular ascetics, every home 
(94%) has a television set, and the modal viewing time is 2-3 hours. 
More telling, perhaps, is that one third of the leisure time of adult 
Israelis is spent viewing television. There are five hours unspoken for 
on working days, of which an average of 1.7 hours go to viewing TV, 
and of the combined 14.1 hours of leisure on the two days of the 
weekend, 4.3 hours go to TV.
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 Compared to 1970, the added hours of 
leisure come from a shorter workday and a longer weekend, in 
addition to the reduced time spent on housework, averaging over an 
hour a day. In a large sense, television may be said to be consuming 
all of the extra leisure time made available since 1970 without major 
harm to other activities. Surprisingly, it has not even reduced time 
spent outside the home. Nevertheless, in close-up, one should note the 
decline in time spent sleeping, eating, reading newspapers and books, 
and listening to the radio. Time spent on each of these activities has 
been reduced since 1970, although only by minutes, not hours, per 
day. 
      Men watch more hours of TV than women. Older people and 
the less educated are heavier viewers. 
      When the first channel was just being launched in 1970, 
Israelis ranked their preferences among television offerings as 
information first, entertainment second, and culture third. Fifty five 
per cent put information in first place. In 1990, information and 
entertainment were ranked first by a smaller proportion of viewers 
(43%), tied for first place with entertainment (43%). That does not 
mean that they wish the quality of programming to be lower: other 
data suggest, rather, that they are asking for more variety. They also 
want more "familiar" programs those that are home-produced--even 
while criticizing the news for being too domestic and not worldly 
enough. 
      It is very difficult to answer the question whether television 
has increased or decreased attention to civic affairs. Israel is 
considered to be a country of avid news consumers, and during the 
years of monopolistic national broadcasting the most highly rated 
program on television by far was the evening news. Radio news 
bulletins and magazines were, and still are, highly attended. Yet, 
comparing 1990 with 1970, we note some decline in viewer 
preference for news over other genres, and a substantial decline in the 
total audience for TV news (especially since the introduction of 
competing channels). The level of newspaper reading remains very 
high (some 90% read a daily newspaper), but the habit of reading two 
newspapers has given way to reading only one especially since the 
major evening tabloids are distributed, in effect, at the same hour as 
the morning papers. Also the number of newspapers has declined. 
      Is television responsible for any of this? Perhaps so. It may be 
argued that in its first years, television presented itself as the national 
showcase for news, reduced attention somewhat to the other news 
media, and gradually redirected audience attention elsewhere, to what 
Postman (1986) would call  amusement. But, like others of the 
ostensible long-run effects of television, this is no more than an 
interpretation, a surmise; it may well be that the sources of change 
originate elsewhere and that changes in television viewing habits is 
more an effect than a cause. 
 
Cultural Practices, 1970-1990 
 
      Has television affected other forms of consuming culture? 
What about the arts? 
      It is important to recall at this point that the amount of time 
spent outside the home-except for the aged-remains virtually 
unchanged between 1970 and 1990, and therefore unaffected by 
television. Enough extra leisure is available for people to include 2-3 
hours per day of TV viewing in their time budgets
4
 without sacrificing 
some 2112 hours "outside"- visiting, meandering, going to meetings, 
and consuming culture. 
      What has changed during these 20 years is what people do 
when they go out. Compared to 1970, there has been a major decline 
in the consumption of the arts. There is a per capita drop in the scope 
and/or frequency of attendance at cinema, theatre, concerts, museums, 
and lectures. This is very surprising since we had reason to expect an 
increase in participation in the arts inasmuch as the society is three 
years more educated since 1970, and education is positively 
correlated with consumption of the arts. 
      Ironically, the box-offices are unaware that there has been a 
decline in per capita consumption of the arts. The reason they don't 
notice is because the population has doubled, so that in 1990 the 
theater and concert halls are as full as they were in 1970! Only we, the 
researchers, know that a sea-change is in progress! Employing a 
variety of measures it can be shown that the scope of the audience, or 
frequency of attendance, or both, have lowered the extent of 
involvement in the institutions of "high" culture. Nobody is surprised 
that cinema attendance is down- casually putting the blame on 
television-but the same drop applies to theater, concerts, museums, 
etc. 
      Before making the wrong interpretation, however, it should be 
added that attendance at sporting events is also down. In 1990, per 
capita attendance at such events is lower than it was in 1970-both in 
scope and in frequency. 
      By contrast, there has been a rise, between 1970 and 1990, in 
the rate of going to pubs, eating out in restaurants, domestic and 
foreign travel, and participatory sports.  
      Our reading of these findings suggests that there is a decline in 
what may be called spectacle and a rise in those activities that are 
active, interactive, intimate, where participants bring their own 
programs along. In other words, there is a decline in those things 
which require one to sit in a particular place at a particular time, to 
watch a curtain go up and listen to some professional performer 
deliver a message from the stage. Correspondingly, leisure pursuits 
that have to do with activity, interactivity, flexible time, one's own 
small group and one's own agenda are on the rise. 
      Let us consider whether television may be to "blame." 
Television might explain these changes in the sense that it has given 
us an overdose of spectacle. People are fed up with staring; there's 
enough spectacle in the living-room, and when one goes outside the 
home one looks for something different. When people do go out they 
want to do more than stare. They want to be active, interactive, 
intimate, creative, and so on. 
      Any explanation, of course, would have to account for the 
decline in reading as well. Clearly, reading is not a spectacle. Nor 
does television displace the functions of reading, as we shall see. But 
reading does involve a lot of looking, and so perhaps the explanation 
does apply-at least until we find a better one. 
      Another possibility is that television satiates the appetite for 
the arts and the other media. We would all intuitively agree that 
cinema attendance has been hurt by television. The fact is, however, 
that people are seeing more, not fewer, films than they did in 1970, 
but they are seeing them on TV. This may be equally true for theater, 
concerts, sports, even museums, as well as reading fiction and reading 
news. The arts, especially cinema, are the content of television. 
According to McLuhan's (1964) rule, each new medium incorporates 
its predecessor as content. Perhaps television gratifies these needs for 
experience of the arts. 
      One must also take account of the alleged decline of the 
performing arts in other countries, too.
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 Of course, television may be 
the cause here as well, but a competing explanation would suggest 
that the culture of pluralism and postmodernism has challenged the 
Western canon and shaken up the entrenched hierarchy of "high" and 
"popular" art. It may be that people--even the upwardly mobile--don't 
"have to" prefer Beethoven to rock any more. We have already noted 
the coming of age of the second generation of Israelis whose parents 
originate from Africa and Asia, and the highest drop in arts 
participation is among the Israeli-born of 20-30 years, not only among 
those of Eastern origin but among those of Western parentage as well. 
The fact that the decline is no less strong among the Western groups 
born to television rekindles the possibility that television may be a 
cause. 
      What we are suggesting is that television may have preempted 
the other performing arts by doing what they do, as well as fostering 
an awareness that the rest of society is doing the same thing at the 
same time. In this sense, television offered the "togetherness" of a 
spectacle, superceding the spectacle of going to the theater, a concert, 
or to a political rally to share an experience with others who are 
present. Is it possible, we are asking, that the collective experience of 
viewing television-- of viewing one-channel, public television-has 
satiated not only the desire for spectacle but the further need for 
widely shared experience and deliberation? Rather than contributing 
to the atomization of society and undermining its culture, as the 
opponents feared, Israel Television may have moved the collectivity 
from outside to inside, but served the collectivity very well, 
nevertheless. Stated otherwise, we are speculating on the possibility 
that 20 years of monopolistic public television offered Israelis a 
strong new taste of collectivity in the double sense of simultaneous 
communion with very large numbers of one's compatriots, and shared 
content of collective import. Cardiff and Scannell (1987) make much 
the same case for the early days of both BBC radio and BBC 
television. Dialectically, we further propose that this "togetherness" 
and its implicit obligations became tiresome and oppressive after a 
while (as did other aspects of collective culture) and pushed people to 
find groups of intimates with whom to do "other" kinds of things. 
 
 
Value Changes, 1970—1990 
 
      Another area in which we have observed change between 
1970 and 1990 is the area of values, and these changes also 
reverberate with some of the concerns of the opponents of television. 
But almost nobody would venture that television is powerful enough, 
in itself, to have induced change in such deep-seated values. It is more 
reasonable that the impetus for change comes from elsewhere, and 
that the institutionalization of television and the viewing habits that it 
cultivates are only part of a larger picture. Let us now examine these 
changes, paying particular attention to values such as individualism 
versus collectivism and hedonism versus asceticism, that have entered 
our discussion so far.  
      At the outset, it should be emphasized that the society is very 
traditional on the whole. Compared to other western-oriented societies, 
family, nation and collectivity are very important, as is connection 
with the religious tradition. National and traditional holidays involve 
almost everyone, whether in religious or secular guise. Escapism is 
very low. But changes are taking place, slowly but surely. 
      We asked a series of value questions in this national survey 
about the "importance" Israelis attribute (1) to self, (2) to family, (3) 
to friends, (4) to state and (5) to peoplehood. Questions touched on 
affective and cognitive aspects in each of these realms. We asked, for 
example: How important is it for you to know yourself, to want to 
study, to make your day an orderly one, to feel that you are using your 
time well, to strive for a higher living standard, to escape from 
everyday reality, to overcome loneliness, and so on. This is the 
domain of self-concern. For the primary group area, we asked about 
the importance, cognitively and emotionally, of spending time with 
family and friends. With respect to state and people, we asked how 
important is it to you to understand what's going on in the world? 
How important is it to you to understand the true character of our 
political leaders? How important is it to you to believe in our leaders, 
feel pride in our state, and so on. 
      Many of the changes are small but consistent and significant; a 
few are very sharp. Table I displays these changes over time. Overall, 
there is an increase in concern for self and a decreased concern for 
society and state. There is more egoism than there was 20 years ago. 
Although concern for the future is still predominant, concern for the 
present has risen sharply. Pleasure is more highly valued, and there is 
an increase in the valuation of leisure as compared with work. Indeed, 
the importance of leisure is now more or less equivalent to the 
importance of work, whereas in 1970 work was more important than 
leisure, future was far more important than present. In sum, there is a. 
 
 
 
rise in what might be called hedonism and individualism, and in the 
legitimacy of concern with self. These are big words for small 
changes, but they are very clear in the data 
Their counterpart-the decline in collectivity-oriented values-may 
be observed in the lesser importance attributed to feelings of 
belonging to the larger society in matters such as the values of 
"having confidence in our leaders," "feeling that I am participating in 
current affairs," and "having pride in our state," although the latter is 
still at the top of the list. Organizational and political membership has 
experienced a decline. While the family retains its high place at both 
time periods, and is highly correlated with orientation to the 
collectivity, the value of spending time with friends has taken a major 
leap, and we know, from our study, that friends pull towards pleasure 
and pluralism and away from the burdens of the collectivity (Katz, 
Trope, and Haas, 1984). There is also a large increase in concern with 
"overcoming loneliness when I am alone at home."  
      Just as we asked in the case of changing cultural practices, we 
asked again in the case of changing values: does television have any 
share in these changes? Is television to "blame" in any way for the 
slow invasion of individualism and hedonism? It seems a fair guess 
that the answer is no. No one can deny that in its twenty years of 
existence as the sole national channel, Israel TV has demonstrated an 
incredible ability to seat the society together every night, to celebrate 
national achievements and religious occasions, indeed, to symbolize 
"togetherness." 
      In fact, if television has had any influence on values, we 
propose that it may have slowed these new trends. Rather than 
promoting individualism, pluralism or hedonism, it is more likely to 
have held them back, while reinforcing the sense of belonging to the 
civic sphere and the nostalgia for collectivity that permeates 
movements of national liberation such as Zionism. It is true that the 
opponents of television forecast a rise in self-oriented concerns and a 
decline in collectivistic ones: that the personal will supplant the 
collective, that egoism will displace altruism, that pleasure will uproot 
dedication. The only trouble with the prediction is that it does not at 
all correspond to the message of the first twenty years of Israel 
television, or to the shared experience it offered. 
 
 
Function of Television and the Other Media 
 
To this point, we have acted as observers comparing changes in 
culture and values with what we know about the institutionalization of 
Israel TV, its organizational form, content and function. We wish to 
turn now to ask the viewers what they think are the functions of 
television and the other media. Do they see things as the researchers 
do? 
      To do so, we asked respondents to assess the helpfulness of 
each of five media-radio, television, book, newspaper, cinema-for 
satisfying each of the "values" outlined in the previous section (and in 
Table 1). For example, following the value question, "How important 
is it for you to understand what's going on in the world?" we asked 
further, "How useful are newspapers for this purpose? How useful are 
books for this purpose?" and so on for the five media. We are really 
asking which media best satisfy each of the respondents' needs or 
values.
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      In 1970, the newspaper was the predominant medium. Of the 
35 concerns or values about which we inquired, the newspaper 
fulfilled more different functions than the other four. In 1990, 
television had displaced the newspaper very clearly as the medium 
which best fulfills more different kinds of concerns.
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      That television has displaced the newspaper as the most 
diversified medium is not so surprising. The important point is that it 
ranks ahead of the other media in the area of the collectivity, 
especially in the emotional aspect of attachment to nation and people. 
More surprising, perhaps, is that television is rated the medium most 
helpful in satisfying national values that are not only affective but 
cognitive, i.e. not only "to feel pride in our state" but "to understand 
the true character of our leaders". 
 
      . 
 
 
After its widespread diffusion in the early '70s, television also became 
important in satisfying many other functions as well, such as 
overcoming loneliness and spending time with family. But in the 
minds of most Israelis, television takes only second place to books or 
cinema or both with respect to personal values such as knowing 
oneself, cultivating good taste, being entertained, aesthetic experience, 
spending time with friends, improving morale. In short, Israelis 
appear to be saying that television has outdistanced the other 
media-especially newspapers- in cognitive and affective aspects of 
relating to the collectivity even more than to the self or to 
interpersonal relations 
The book, for its part, has retained all of its functions and even 
increased slightly in the number of important concerns it is thought to 
serve. Although the frequency of reading (not the overall percentage 
of readers) has declined somewhat, the book is holding its own from a 
functional point of view. Substantively, we can say that the book best 
fulfills functions related to self, especially affective ones. It is 
supreme among the five media in these functions. In Victor Nell's 
terms, "it is the affective part of self which the book best serves." 
      Along with books, cinema continues to share the self-oriented 
and affective realm, that is, the emotional aspects of self-fulfillment. 
Cinema has become altogether different from television, functionally 
speaking, over the period of 20 years. If in 1970 cinema was 
considered the universal medium of entertainment, by 1990 it has 
become an art and behaves like the other arts, in the sense of being 
correlated with education: the higher the education the higher the 
consumption of cinema, and of theater, concerts, museums and 
galleries. This was not true for cinema prior to the inception of 
television. 
      The cinema and television do not fulfill each other's functions 
any more. What we now have is a cinema that is allied with books on 
the one hand, and television which is allied with radio. This may be 
truer in Israel than elsewhere, since news and public affairs dominate 
the broadcasting media, and the populace is highly politicized. It also 
explains the displacement by television of the functions of the 
newspaper. In 1970, people apparently thought that TV would join 
film as a medium of fiction and pleasure, but this expectation has not 
so far been fulfilled. Instead, TV joined newspapers and radio as a 
medium of current affairs. Yet the picture may reverse again as 
television channels multiply, and TV may yet rejoin cinema as a 
medium of pleasure. 
      In a word, after 20 years of Israel television, Israelis see it as it 
saw itself, namely, as a medium of the collectivity. More important 
than self-gratification, Israelis experienced their one-channel 
television as a way to connect with the larger society and its civic 
concerns. Escapism and entertainment are thought to have been better 
served by other media. 
 
Conclusion 
 
      In comparing Israel of 1970 with Israel of 1990-prior to the 
diversification of channels now replacing the 20-year old 
monopoly-we have documented three areas of change: (1) The 
content of values has moved, however slowly, in an individualistic 
direction, in the direction of pleasure at the expense of civic 
obligation. (2) There is a decline in participation in the perforrnative 
arts, and in events that transpire at fixed times and places, with large 
numbers of participants. By contrast, there is a rise in activities that 
involve small groups of people doing their own things, at times and 
places of their own choosing. (3) The perceived division of labor 
among the media suggests that Israeli Jews identify their public 
television (prior to the new competition) as having served collective 
functions rather better (although not more frequently) than 
individualistic or hedonistic functions.  
      Simply stated, the data suggest that Israeli society-its values, 
its cultural practices-is moving slowly away from the collectivism that 
characterized it (and still does, relative to other societies) and towards 
greater self-indulgence. But Israel television cultivates collectivism- 
as its viewers and observers both think. If so, and if television can 
affect basic values at all, we must infer that the process of value 
change has been slowed by television. As critical school theorists used 
to say, non-change or slowed change may be the major effect of the 
media of mass communication (Katz, 1980). 
      Nor can television be held directly responsible for the decline 
in the patterns of collective consumption of culture and the arts. The 
most compelling argument we can find to connect the two is that 
individualistic and interactive patterns of "going out" are, ironically, a 
reaction against the collectivism of staying home with television.
8
 In 
the simplest sense, if Israel television has successfully transformed 
the home into a theater or forum, then people want to do something 
else when they go out. In a larger sense, however, it suggests a 
saturation not only with the togetherness of Israel television but with 
togetherness and sacrifice made by the state and society during the 
first four decades of its embattled history. As in the case of values, 
Israel television is pulling against the stress of change, rather than 
with it. 
      Yet there is a nagging sense in which this may not be true. The 
message of television may be collectivistic, and its symbolic function 
likewise, as rightly perceived by its viewers. But there is also the 
reality of the medium as technology, and the way in which it situates 
its audience. While it may not keep them from going out, the fact is 
that its offerings can only be consumed at home. People may talk 
about the programs the next morning (30% do), but is this the 
equivalent of going out to a meeting of one's trade union, or political 
party, or going out to the theater? Whether television has made 
home-and-family into a locus of political action and cultural 
experience is still an open question. It is equally possible that it has 
done no more than give people the illusion of being "engaged," in line 
with what Lazarsfeld and Merton (1948) call the "narcotizing 
dysfunction" of broadcast news, or what Gerbner et al. (1979) think of 
as pulling people out of society and into the isolation of their living 
rooms. 
      And one wonders, similarly, whether television as a medium 
has not had a major share in the personalization of politics that is now 
sweeping the country. Primary elections have displaced the power of 
the party chiefs in selecting candidates for the parliament, and a 
populist law has been passed calling for the direct election of the 
prime minister, to the consternation of most social scientists. There is 
good reason to believe that television has weakened the party system 
by moving it indoors and, willy nilly, making it intimate. 
      Thus, early opposition to the introduction of television in 
Israel may have (1) been right, but for the wrong reasons, and (2) 
been right, but prematurely. Being right for the wrong reasons, the 
opponents suspected that television harbored a subversive message, 
not so much realizing that it was the medium itself rather than the 
message that may be problematic. Being right but prematurely, they 
could not have anticipated that the function of national integration 
would be so well served by Israel Television during its first two 
decades. But they may be right from now on. In the era of commercial, 
multi-channel narrowcasting, Israel may now have to make way for 
the escapist self-indulgence prematurely anticipated by the early 
opponents and latter-day critics like Houston and Postman.  
      Perhaps even more important than the message or the medium, 
the influence of television may be related to the form of its 
institutionalization in a particular society. The manifest and latent 
effects of a monopoly channel, operated by an independent Authority, 
in a newly democratic society, with a strong collective will, may be 
altogether different from the competitive, mixed commercial/public, 
multi-channel system now beginning to broadcast to a much more 
individualistic society of Israelis. 
      To summarize: (1) In spite of a persistent collectivism, we 
perceive a slow but sure trend towards self-gratification among 
Israelis at the expense of some decline in the pioneering values that 
characterized the society twenty and more years ago. (2) We perceive 
a decline in collective forms of out-of-home leisure in favor of more 
differentiated and pleasure-oriented pursuits typically enjoyed with 
small groups of friends. (3) Since its establishment 20 years ago, over 
one-third of leisure time in Israel is spent viewing television and some 
(but by no means all) of the functions of other media have been 
subsumed by television. (4) The safest thing to say about the long-run 
effects of television on the changes in Israel culture and society is that 
it is an impossible question to answer. (5) If one has to choose-on the 
basis of these comparative data-whether Israel television gave more 
support to the individualizing trend or to the norm of collectivism, 
there is a much stronger case to be made for the latter. The 
collectivism we have in mind has to do with shared and simultaneous 
pursuits, governed by norms of self-sacrifice and mutual obligation, 
performed in the knowledge that everybody else is similarly occupied; 
the Jewish Sabbath would be a classic example. (6) If Israel television 
did indeed serve as a bulwark against individualistic and hedonistic 
trends, it did so because of its message (offering a shared agenda to 
the society), because of the technology of electronic simultaneity and 
because of its independent-but-monopolistic form of organization. (7) 
At a deeper level, however, some of the latent aspects of the message 
(patriotism, perpetual tension, etc.) and of the medium (the atomistic 
way in which it situates viewers, its mode of personalization of issues) 
may also have pulled in the other direction. (8) There is good reason 
to expect that the new multi-channel television with its emphasis on 
choice and consumerism will give much stronger support to 
individuating trends it situates viewers, its mode of personalization of 
issues) may also have pulled in the other direction. (8) There is good 
reason to expect that the new multi-channel television with its 
emphasis on choice and consumerism will give much stronger support 
to individuating trends. 
      To repeat, the closest parallel to the argument of this paper 
about the first 20 years of television in Israel is Cardiff and Scannell's 
(1987) analysis of the national integration which was fostered during 
the early days of BBC radio and then BBC television.* 
 
Notes 
 
1.  While the 1990 study included both Jews and Arabs, the 1970 study 
interviewed only Israeli Jews and therefore this comparison is limited to the 
Jewish population. 
2.  To repeat, Israeli Arabs are not included in this comparative study because 
the 1970 study did not encompass the Arab sector. It is noteworthy, however. 
That Israel Television is the primary and most reliable television news 
source mentioned by Israeli Arabs in 1990. We make no attempt here, 
however, to analyze the functions of television for the Arab sector. 
3.  These data are from "time budget" analysis where the interviewee is aided in 
reconstructing how he/she spent the past 24 hours. Averaging an activity 
such as TV viewing in this way includes the 0 hours of those who did not 
view at all "yesterday." Hence the discrepancy between the 2-3 hours of the 
modal viewer and the slightly lower figures (1.7 on weekdays, 2.3 on 
Fridays, 2.0 on Saturdays) noted here. Each fraction of an hour equals 6 
minutes; thus 1.7 equals 102 minutes. 
4  TV viewing averaged one hour in 1970 when many people were still 
without sets of their own, and the number of broadcast hours was small. 
5.  We have roughly comparable data from several European countries and the 
U.S. However, no systematic analysis has yet been undertaken across 
cultures. 
6. Questions about the utility of the media were asked only with respect to 
those values considered at least "somewhat important" by the respondent, 
and with respect to those media to which the respondent was exposed at 
least to some extent. Thus, a respondent who attributed "no importance at 
all" to the need "to experience beauty” was not asked which media helped 
gratify this need. If he/she never goes out to see a film, questions about the 
helpfulness of cinema were not asked. 
7. The discussion that follows is based on changes in the roles of the five 
media with respect to each of the 35 different needs or values. Table 2 
groups these needs into 9 categories, and averages them. 
8.  That does not mean that the higher standard of living and self·-indulgence is 
not to be found in Israeli homes. Our argument, rather, is that the home is 
home to television, and that television is experienced as "we."   
*Some of Meyrowitz (1985) also has bearing. 
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